In this paper, we explore the impact of quantiles on optimal strategies under state dynamics driven by both individual noise, common noise and Poisson jumps. We first establish an optimality system satisfied the quantile process under jump terms. We then turn to investigate a new class of finite horizon mean-field games with common noise in which the payoff functional and the state dynamics are dependent not only on the state-action pair but also on conditional quantiles. Based on the bestresponse of the decision-makers, it is shown that the equilibrium conditional quantile process satisfies a stochastic partial differential equation in the non-degenerate case. A closed-form expression of the quantile process is provided in a basic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with common noise.
Related works on mean-field games with common noise
Anonymous sequential and mean-field games with common noise can be considered as a natural generalization of the mean-field game problems (see [2, 3] and the references therein). The works in [5, 6] considered mean-field games with common noise and obtained optimality system that determine mean-field equilibria conditioned of the information. The work in [7] provides sufficiency conditions for well-posedness of mean-field games with common noise. Existence of solutions of the resulting stochastic optimality systems are examined in [8, 9, 10] . A probabilistic approach to the master equation is developed in [11] . In order to determine the optimal strategies of the decision-maker, the previous works used a maximum principle or a master equation which involves a FokkerPlanck equation (see [12, 13, 14] and the references therein). Due to the inverse nature of the quantile, it is not straightforward to use the master equation proposed in earlier works [12, 13] . The results obtained in [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] for well-posedness, existence and moment estimates do not directly apply to the quantile-based metrics, except under very strong assumptions. The methodology used here extends the work in [4] that is for uncontrolled systems without jump terms.
In this paper we address the question of finding a forward equation satisfied by the quantile of measure-dependent stochastic differential equations with jump terms. The main difficulty lies in expressing the propagation of the common noise to the distribution of states with jump terms. The presence of the global (common) noise creates random mean-field quantities: the mean-field limit is a random measure, the conditional mean is random, the cumulative distribution as well as the quantiles are random processes.
Contribution
The contribution of the present work can be summarized as follows.
• We introduce a new class of mean-field games with common noise and Lévy jumps where the payoff functions and the state dynamics are described based upon conditional quantiles and jumps.
• We examine the conditional quantile process as a result of a mean-field interaction in presence of individual and common noise. We use Itô's calculus and implicit function theorem to derive a simple formula for the quantile process.
• The methodology is illustrated in a simple auction mechanism in which the state dynamics mimic a controlled Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with a common noise. The common noise here captures the market uncertainty. The decision-makers are prosumers (consumer-producer) who can submit their bids and the respective bids that are below the market price may be selected depending on the quantity needed by the operator to compensate the mismatch between supply and demand in peak hours. By a direct decomposition method, we compute the quantile process when the optimal strategies are employed. We provide a closed-form expression of the quantile process in presence of common noise and show that it satisfies the new dynamics established in Proposition 1 and 2.
Organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a generic game model based on quantiles and with a common noise. Section 3 focuses on existence and well-posedness problems. Section 4 presents the main technical results. In Section 5 we provide a basic application to dynamic auction mechanism with common noise. Section 6 concludes the paper. Table 1 summarizes the notations used in the paper.
Quantile-based mean-field game
Consider the following mean-field game with common noise. The set of decisionmakers is I = {1, 2, . . .}. Let T > 0, the interval [0, T ] is the horizon of the interaction. The state space is S = R. The set of probability measures on S is denoted by ∆(S). For each decision-maker i, a non-empty control action set A is available. An instant payoff of decision-maker i is
where s i is the state of i, m f is the quantile process, a i is the control action of i at time t and L 1 ([0, T ] × (0, 1), R) is the set of integrable processes from [0, T ] × (0, 1) to R. The dynamics of the state is explicitly given by an Itô's stochastic differential equation of Liouville type that is dependent on the quantile, and has a jump and a common noise term.
with s i (0) = s i0 ∈ S, and
whereb is the drift coefficient functional, σ is the diffusion coefficient functional related to the individual noise, σ o is the diffusion coefficient functional related to the common noise of the game, γ is the jump rate. B i , B o are independent standard Brownian motions on a given probability space (Ω, F, {F t }, P). B i ,Ñ i represent the local uncertainties of decision-maker i and B o is a common noise or global uncertainty. F t is the natural filtration generated by s i0 , B i , N i , B o . Denote by F Bo t the natural filtration generated by the common noise B o . A solution to the state equation will be denoted by s i (t) := s si0,ai,m f i (t). The process m f is the f −quantile associated to the random measure set of probability measures on S m(t, .) conditional probability measure of the state at time t f fraction in (0, 1)
which is the conditional law of the state
where F (t, p) = m(t, (−∞, p]) is the conditional cumulative distribution, this solves F (t, m f (t)) = f even when F has some flat regions or discontinuity. N i is a Poisson random measure with Lévy measure µ(dθ), independent of W i and the measure µ is a σ−finite measure over Θ.
One of the key questions addressed in this paper is to find the dynamics of the quantile process m f . Note that, the function σ o (s i , m f , a i ) depends on the state, quantile and the control action. This helps to capture some scenarios where the common noise influences each of the decision-makers, but the way it is perceived may be different from one decision-maker to another.
The quantile mean-field game is played as follows. Given a initial state s i0 which is drawn from the initial distribution m 0 , the game G(s i0 ) proceeds as follows. At each instant, each decision-maker observes the state (perfect monitoring, perfect state observation), chooses a control action according her strategy (defined below) and observes/measures her payoff.
An admissible control of decision-maker i ∈ I is progressively measurable and integrable process with respect to the filtration
, taking values in A. We denote the set of all admissible control strategy of decisionmaker i by A :
is the set of all progressively F−measurable and integrable R−valued processes defined on [0, T ]. We identify two processes a i and
A quantile-based strategy for decision-maker i starting at time 0 is a Borelmeasurable map (renamed again by)
for which there exists > 0 such that for any (t,
To each strategy profile one can associate a control process profile. This will allow us to work with both open-loop and feedback form of strategies by considering a i (., s si0,ai i , m f ). The cumulative payoff of decision-maker i is
The risk-neutral quantile-based mean-field game G 0,T,f (s i0 ) is the normal-form game G 0,T,f (s i0 ) = (I, (A, ER i,T ) i∈I ).
Best response to quantile process
Each decision-maker i revises her strategy and responds to the stochastic quantile process m f and chooses her best response strategy a i by solving
, is called a best response to the quantile process m f . The set of best response strategies of decision-maker i is denoted by BR(m f ).
Quantile-based Mean-Field Equilibrium
Define the following equilibrium point problem: Find (a *
The difference between the best response problem and the equilibrium problem is that, in the former the conditional quantile process m f is given, the latter can be seen as a fixed-point as the conditional quantile is the quantile conditioned on the distribution and the common noise, which in turn, is obtained from the states of the individuals.
Well-posedness
Well-posedness of the state equation: The state dynamics of decision-maker i is the following controlled Liouville system:
where f ∈ (0, 1), m 0 is the initial measure. The probability law of s i (t) is
]. In order to provide a sufficiency condition for existence of solution to (9) we impose the following assumption: H0: the coefficient functionsb, σ o , σ are continuous functions, uniformly Lipschitz in the first component s, twice continuously differentiable in s i , σ nonsingular, s i (0) is L 1 -integrable and indistinguishable (invariance in distribution per permutation of index).
Lemma 1 (Existence). Under H0, there exists a positive function of time, β, such that sup
There exists at least one solution to (9) .
The proof is by now standard using linear growth recursion, and is therefore omitted. Uniqueness to (9) is an open issue. This is because we do not have an estimate bound of the quantile: we are lacking an estimate bound for the quantity |b(
It is important to notice that the conditional law s *
is not a deterministic distribution. The random distribution m(t, ds) solves a stochastic Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation of mean-field type. By Itô's formula, m(t, s) solves the following stochastic partial differential equation (SPDE) in a weak sense: For any bounded Borelmeasurable function (test function) φ,
where
and the adjoint J * of the operator J is given by
Lemma 2 (Conditional density). The conditional density is stochastic and solves the stochastic integro-PDE given by
Proof. To establish the stochastic integro-Fokker-Planck equation, we use the decomposition s i (t) = s i,nc (t) + s i,c (t) as common part and individual noises part with
The probability law of s i (t) |F Bo,s0 t can be expressed in terms of probability of s i,nc (t) :
We apply Itô's formula to the latter expression to derive the following:
The forward equation for the individual noises part m nc solves
Hence the announced result.
Solving McKean-Vlasov type SPDE is not a trivial task. Next, we provide a simple approximation of the distribution using virtual agents. Let the strategy a i be a progressively measurable and functional of s i , m f . Then, the coefficient functions can be rewritten as
The random measure m can be approximated by an empirical measure process
We use an Euler-Maruyama method over the discrete time space
By de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage's theorem [16, 15] , it is well-known that there is a random m such that m n converges in distribution to m. Moreover, conditioning on m, the weak convergence of s n i is obtained by the convergence of the empirical m f,n (t). These solutions are extended step by step from interval [
n ]. Furthermore, we know that the limiting random measure solves the stochastic Fokker-Planck equation (6) , it remains to identify an equation satisfied by the quantile process. To do so, we again impose a certain regularity of coefficient functions to get a positive measure that is continuous with respect to the Lebesgue and that does not vanish on open set.
Main Results
This section presents our technical main result.
Quantile Dynamics with Jumps
The next result presents the key quantile dynamics and its relationship with m and m s . Proposition 1. Under H0, the quantile process m f solves the following stochastic differential equation:
The structure of the quantile process was proved in [4] in the controlledindependent and jump-free case (γ = 0). Proposition 1 extends the work in [4] to include state-quantile feedback control case with jumps under suitable conditions imposed in H0.
Proof. In Appendix.
Since the ratio ms m can be written as (log m) s , we obtain
Remark 1. Noting that m is a random measure given by m(t, ds) = P
which is the conditional distribution of s i (t) given the filtration F
, we obtain m f as a random process satisfying (10) . When there is no common noise σ o → 0, the individual and independent Brownian motions will generate a deterministic quantile if the strategies adopted by the decision-makers are adapted to F Bi t . From (10), the deterministic quantile evolution is given by
is not available in simple closed-form, nor the expression of the inverse error function erf −1 (f ). However, its properties are well understood through its characterization as the solution of the non-linear ordinary differential equation with boundary conditions. In the case of a Gaussian distribution s nc (t) = µ(t) + σ(t)Z, with mean µ(t) and variance σ 2 (t), the quantile function of that distribution is then Q snc (t, f ) = µ(t) + σ(t)Q Z (f ). Clearly, this solves the system (10). 
with Θ = R, The operator J is
where λ = µ(θ)dθ, µ(dθ) = λμ(θ)dθ andμ(θ), is a probability density function. By identification,
The stochastic integro-Fokker-Planck equation yields
Let compute m nc . We try a solution in the following form: By choosing σ = 1, the latter system is reduced to 
The quantile system reduces to
When δ vanishes, the quantile becomes m
X is the quantile associated to the mixed process X(t) = B(t)+ R θN (t, dθ). It is easily to check that the latter expression solves the quantile SDE (10).. It is well-known that the Wasserstein distance W 2 between two distributions µ 0 and µ 1 is related to the quantile process in one-dimensional case via the relation
Based on the explicit representation of the quantile one can target best response problems such as inf ai W 2 (L target i , m T ).
Stochastic maximum principle
Let (p, q, q 0 ,r) be the adjoint processes associated to the drift, individual diffusion, common diffusion and jump terms respectively. Let H be the Pontryagin function
Define the first order adjoint process as dp
where H s is a notation for r s +b s p + σ s q + σ o,s q o + Θ γ sr (., θ)µ(dθ) evaluated at the best response strategy, f , a i ), and bounded. Then, the first-order adjoint system is a linear SDE with almost surely bounded coefficient functions. There is a unique F Bo,B,N,s0 −adapted solution such that
Proof. Assume conditions H0 hold. Then, one obtain a linear SDE in (p, q, q o ,r).
In addition, the coefficient of the linear SDE of Liouiville type has almost surely bounded coefficient function. Such a linear SDE ha a solution. From martingale representation theorem, there is unique solution that is F Bo,B,N,s0 −adapted solution such that
These strong smoothness conditions on b, σ, σ o , r, g can be considerably weakened using representations of weak sub/super-differential sets.
Illustrative Example
In this section we examine a basic mean-field game with common noise. The energy sector is evolving with the involvement of prosumers. A prosumer (producer-consumer) is a user that not only consumes electricity, but can also produce and store electricity. We examine how the prosumer energy market can be used to compensate a portion of peak hours energy (NegaWatts). NegaWatts is the amount of demand they shift from peak to off-peak time. The prosumers can contribute to the NegaWatts using their own storage or by selling energy to the operators, which creates a prosumer market within the global energy market. Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which the prosumer market contribution needs to be particularly important between 5pm and 9pm where the production capacity of the energy operators is exceeded. The work in [1] proposed individual risk in mean-field control with application to demand response. Their model is a leader-follower mean-field model in which the leader makes decisions based on quantiles. However, their model differs from the common noise model of mean-field games considered in this paper. Figure 1 : Prosumer market can be used to compensate the demand during peak hours between 5pm and 9pm.
Multi-Winner Auction
We consider a dynamic interaction with N prosumers in an energy market who adopted an auction mechanism to sell their extra energy to an operator who needs that energy during peak hours. We are not imposing the lowest price auction format because there is a total demand and the operator is looking for a certain quantity to compensate the NegaWatts. As a consequence, several prosumers may win the auction (Fig. 2) . Let us denote the set of prosumers by I = {1, . . . , n}. Let us assume that then lowest bids will be selected by the operator, withn ≤ n. The authority allows only positive prices (bids). We change the scale and work with the log-price or log-bid in order to get a wider spectrum that covers all real values. The log-bid of a prosumer belongs 
Supply and Demand Matching
The interaction between the prosumers and the energy operator starts at time 0. At time step t, the energy operator needs a certain quantity to compensate the demand of the customers (for example, during peak hours). The market clearing condition is when demand equals supply and the bid is less than the market price p n (t) at time t. The operator is looking fornQ(t) units of energy at time t.The selected supply of the prosumers at time t is
We define the mean-field process of the finite population as
The demand equals supply ifQ(t) i∈I 1l {log bi(t)≤log p n } =n(t)Q(t), i.e.,
As the quantities are larger, and the scales are chosen such thatn n goes to a fraction f of quantity of energy available to the market. The global market price becomes the f −quantile process m f of the measure m that is the limit of the empirical distribution m n of the log bids. Define the quantile associated to the fraction f at time t, as m f (t) = Q(t, f ) = inf {p ∈ R : f ≤ F (t, p)} , where F (t, p) = m(t, (−∞, log p]) is the cumulative distribution, this solves F (t, m f (t)) = f, even when F has some flat regions or discontinuous. Note that the distribution m will be stochastic due to the global market uncertainty. It allows us to capture a range of prosumer behaviors for the energy of the future. Each prosumer wants to be among the winners of the auction, the ones chosen by the operator and therefore the bids should be below the market price p and the prosumer supply should match the fraction quantity f. The winners gets a reward which is 1 when a 1 ≤ a 2 ≤ . . . an ≤ p n and the total quantitynQ(t) units that the operator is looking for is achieved.
Log-bid dynamics with common noise
Here the state of prosumer i at time t is s i (t), which represents the log bid of prosumer i. s i is a stochastic process and solves the stochastic differential equation (2) of quantile-type with common noise with the drift functionb =
and σ(t) are independent of s i , m f . Prosumer i aims to optimize the waste of the remaining energy by selling it in the prosumer market. The auction ends at time T. The optimal control strategy is trivial in this case and it is given by a * i (t) = m f (t), which is the conditional quantile process. The state dynamics becomes a sort of time-inhomogeneous OrnsteinUhlenbeck (O-U) process (see Figure 3) . Density of Log-Bid Figure 3 : Samples of Log-bid in the prosumer market.
Uniqueness of the state
For any given L 1 -process m f the state dynamics admits a unique solution. Below we provide the solution in closed-form expression.
5.0.2
Closed-form expression of the state
Then,
It is easy to verify that the above solution χ is unique in the sense that if there are two processes s i and χ i solving the state dynamics then P(s i (t) = χ i (t), a.e.) = 1.
5.0.3
Closed-form expression of the optimal strategy
The equilibrium strategy is the conditional quantile a * i (t) = m f (t) which we explicitly derive below. The solution s i (t) is decomposed into individual noise terms and common noise terms as
Conditioning on the common noise part we compute
Since s i,nc (t) is a Gaussian process, the inverse of Φ(t, .) :
is uniquely determined and
with µ i,nc (t) = e −αt s i0 and σ 2 nc is the variance of s nc (t).
where m f nc (t) is the quantile of the strictly individual noise part, i.e., the quantile of the process
Note that if the initial processes s i0 are independent and identically distributed, and independent of B i then m f nc (t) the quantile of the process z 0 is deterministic. We compute the deterministic term thanks to Equation (10) .
It is easily verified that the variance solves the ordinary differential equation:
. By Proposition 1 we check that
Using the latter equation we compute the operator cost during peak hours. The mismatch between the supply S o of the operator and the demand D of the consumers creates the certain cost
which is obtained from the stochastic differential equation solved by the optimal quantile process.
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a new class of mean-field games called quantilebased mean-field games. Due to the inverse nature of the quantile, the existing methodologies previously developed for existence, uniqueness and moment estimates fail, except under very strong assumptions. In this work, a weak solution approach was proposed and a direct method was employed as an illustration. Explicit closed-form expressions are provided a class of mean-field games with tanh(.) as a drift function. However, number of issues remain to be addressed. The term (log m) s plays a crucial role in the dynamics is not available in the current formulation. In our future work, we plan to investigate possible representation of the log-likelihood in terms m f without using directly m, m s .
[14] Graber, P. 1-198, (1985) .
Proof of the Quantile Dynamics, Proposition 1
Consider the implicit equation with stochastic quantities q and m :
Assuming regularity we have the stochastic integro-PDE solved by m|B o :
Itô's formula applied to the implicit equation becomes
Note that F q = m(t, q) which is stochastic quantity. The main difficulty here is a theory of differentiation with respect to m. We can use different notions such as Wasserstein gradient, Fréchet derivative, functional derivative, Gâteaux derivative. However, here, the derivative we will need involve m(t, q) which is the conditional density evaluated to the quantile, which is obviously a degenerate quantity. In order the make the differentiation part self-content, we use a mollifier approximation of the conditional distribution of
Note that F q (q, s 1 , . . . , s n ) = 1 n n j=1 ρ (q − s i ) = 0 which is non-zero stochastic quantity. Since F q = 0, one can use the implicit function theorem and it provides the existence of a local function q = q(f, s 1 , . . . , s n ).
We compute the first and second derivative terms that are needed in the Itô's formula:
Using the forward SDE solved by s we compute the following terms:
By identification of the diffusion terms we obtain
Using the relation i F si = −F q , and taking the limit we obtain
We have lim n, F q = lim 1 n n j=1 ρ (q − s i ) = lim ρ (q − s)m(x)dx = m(q). We now compute the quadratic variation terms 
The limit of the second derivative Fis lim F= lim 
